Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) empowers multinational corporations to sue governments before panels of corporate lawyers.
These lawyers can award the corporations unlimited sums to be paid by taxpayers, including for the loss of expected future profits that the attorneys surmise the corporations would have earned if not for the challenged policy. The corporations need only convince the lawyers that a law, safety regulation, court ruling, or other government action violates the investors’ rights that an agreement enforced by ISDS grants them.
ISDS tribunals often make countries pay for tribunal costs even when dismissing corporate attacks, so the mere threat of a case has a chilling effect on domestic and international policies.
By elevating individual corporations to the same status as sovereign governments, ISDS drastically consolidates and formalizes corporate power.
Below are some of the most egregious ISDS attacks on public interest policies, but there are likely many more that we may never know about due to the secretive nature of ISDS.
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A Spanish company wins $40 million from Mexican taxpayers when a controversial hazardous waste facility is denied authorization, as it posed great risk to a nearby UNESCO World Heritage site and Indigenous communities.
In December 2009, Abengoa, a Spanish technology firm, filed a claim against Mexico under the Mexico-Spain BIT for preventing the company from operating a waste management facility that the local community of Zimapan strongly opposed, on environmental grounds.1 The plant was to be built on a geological fault line across from a dam and the Sierra Gorda biosphere reserve, an UNESCO World Heritage site and home to Nanhu and Otomi Indigenous communities. The region was already contaminated with arsenic from previous mining operations. The community contended that building a waste facility on a fault line, by a dam, in an area contaminated with arsenic, near Indigenous communities and an environmental reserve posed a significant environmental threat.2
As a result of substantial public opposition, Abengoa’s land use permit was not renewed in December 2007, although construction continued anyway.3 In April 2009, clashes broke out between a group of people from Zimapan and the Mexican federal police over the plant. As a result, the company’s operating license was revoked several days later.4 Despite this, the situation escalated as Mexican federal police were accused of abuses against the Indigenous population and federal government officials declared the plant could open without municipal authority.5 In March 2010, the municipality of Zimapan declared that the operating license was invalid because it was not collectively issued by the city council and did not comply with the public interest.6
Abengoa alleged that the government actions impeding the operation of its waste plant violated its BIT-protected investor rights.7 In April 2013, a tribunal ruled in favor of Abengoa, deciding that the denial of an operating license for the controversial hazardous waste facility amounted to an indirect expropriation of Abengoa’s investment and that the local government’s actions violated the corporation’s guarantee of a “minimum standard of treatment.”8 The tribunal ordered Mexico to pay Abengoa more than $40 million, plus interest, as compensation for its expected future profits from the waste plant and to cover half of the corporation’s own tribunal and legal costs.9
A U.S. water company (subsidiary of Enron) fails to provide safe drinking water, overcharges Argentinians for contaminated water, and sues the Argentinean government for $165 million plus interest and fees after the government advised its residents to not pay for the overpriced, polluted water.
A U.S. water company Azurix Corp. (an Enron subsidiary) filed a claim against Argentina under the Argentina-United States BIT in 2001 over a dispute related to its controversial water services contract in the province of Buenos Aires.1 During a 1999 water privatization deal, the company won a 30-year concession to provide water and sewage treatment to 2.5 million people.2 Within a few months, residents complained of foul odors coming from the water. Local governments advised against drinking or paying for tap water.3 After the problem was identified as algae contamination of a reservoir, Azurix alleged the algae was the government’s responsibility and demanded compensation for associated costs.4 The government argued that Azurix had a contractual responsibility to ensure clean drinking water.5 Azurix withdrew from its contract in 2001.6
Azurix then launched its claim under the BIT, claiming that the government had expropriated its investment and denied the firm “fair and equitable treatment” by not allowing rate increases and not investing sufficient public funds in the water infrastructure.7 In its deliberations, the tribunal weighed on whether legitimate public interest policies could constitute BIT violations. The three tribunalists decided, “the issue is not so much whether the measure concerned is legitimate and serves a public purpose, but whether it is a measure that, being legitimate and serving a public purpose, should give rise to a compensation claim.”8 The tribunal ruled that Argentina violated Azurix’s right to “fair and equitable treatment,” among other breaches, and ordered the government to pay the Enron subsidiary $165 million plus interest, in addition to covering almost all of the tribunal’s costs.9
Peruvian taxpayers were ordered to give a Canadian mining company $30 million for halting a highly unpopular silver mining project that threatened to contaminate Lake Titicaca and vital surrounding waterways.
Bear Creek Mining Corporation, a Canadian mining company, filed an investor-state claim against Peru under the Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement (FTA) for the revocation of their approval for a silver mining project.1 In 2007, Bear Creek was granted approval to operate a silver mining project located in Santa Ana, near the border of Bolivia and Lake Titicaca, the largest freshwater lake in South America.2 However, since approving the project, Peruvian legislators were faced with strong opposition to the mining project in the form of regional protests and large-scale social unrest, due to concerns of the environmental impacts of mining and threat of contamination in the surrounding waterways, especially to the Indigenous communities in the area that rely on Lake Titicaca for fishing and farming.3 As a result, in 2011 the Peruvian government issued Supreme Decree 032, rescinding the company’s rights to operate the Santa Ana mining project and effectively halting their activities.4
Bear Creek claimed that revoking their approval of the mining project constituted violations under the Canada-Peru FTA, including expropriation and fair and equitable treatment. The company also claimed the expropriation caused a reduction in value of their larger silver mining project located 350 km of Santa Ana, Corani, alleging it would be very difficult for Bear Creek to obtain financing for the development of the Corani unless the government returned Santa Ana to Bear Creek.5 The company sought $522 million in damages.6
Two of the three arbitrators ruled in favor of the investor, ordering Peru to compensate Bear Creek $18.2 million in damages plus interests and 75% of Claimant’s arbitration costs for an estimated total of $30.4 million.7 The tribunal reasoned that Peru violated the Canada-Peru FTA by unlawfully expropriating Bear Creek’s investment.8
The sole dissenting arbitrator expressed reproach for the lack of accountability assigned to Bear Creek for contributing to the social unrest, “…the Respondent has clearly established the Claimant’s contributory responsibility, by reason of its acts and omissions, to the social unrest that left the Peruvian government in the predicament it faced, and the need to do something reasonable and lawful to protect public well-being.”9 The dissenting arbitrator further explained the causality between the investor’s acts and omissions and the circumstances that ultimately led to the revocation of the Santa Ana mining project.
An American concrete company retaliated against the Canadian government for requiring thorough environmental assessments before opening a quarry mine in Nova Scotia, to the tune of $7 million.
In May 2008, members of the U.S.-based Clayton family – the owners of a concrete company – and their U.S. subsidiary, Bilcon of Delaware, launched a NAFTA challenge against Canadian environmental requirements affecting their plans to open a basalt quarry and a marine terminal in Nova Scotia.1
The investors planned to blast, extract, and ship out large quantities of basalt from the proposed 152-hectare project,2 located in a key habitat for several endangered species, including one of the world’s most endangered large whale species.3 Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans determined that blasting and shipping activity in this sensitive area required a rigorous assessment given environmental risks and socioeconomic concerns raised by many members of the local communities.4 A government-convened expert review panel concluded that the project would threaten the local communities’ “core values that reflect their sense of place, their desire for self-reliance, and the need to respect and sustain their surrounding environment.”5
On the recommendation of the panel, the government of Canada rejected the project.6 The Clayton family argued that the assessment and resulting decision was arbitrary, discriminatory, and unfair, and thus a breach of NAFTA’s minimum standard of treatment, national treatment, and most favored nation obligations.7
In a March 2015 ruling, two of the three ISDS tribunalists decided that the environmental assessment’s concern for “community core values” was “arbitrary” and frustrated the expectations of the foreign investors.8 This, they asserted, violated a broad interpretation of the minimum standard of treatment obligation, which they imported from another ISDS tribunal (Waste Management).9 The tribunal majority also declared a national treatment violation.10
The dissenting tribunalist explicitly warned of the chilling effect the decision would have: “Once again, a chill will be imposed on environmental review panels which will be concerned not to give too much weight to socio-economic considerations or other considerations of the human environment in case the result is a claim for damages under NAFTA Chapter 11. In this respect, the decision of the majority will be seen as a remarkable step backwards in environmental protection.”11
In 2019, the tribunal issued an award on damages, ordering Canadian taxpayers to pay the quarry investors $7 million, plus interests.12 Due to their dissatisfaction with the award – $7 million in contrast to their initial claim for over $440 million – the investors later petitioned a Canadian judge to set aside the award issued by the tribunal, arguing the tribunal violated public policy, exceeded its jurisdiction in its causation analysis, and breached due process and natural justice. The Canadian judge dismissed the petition.13
Chevron, a U.S. Big Oil giant, launched an ISDS claim against Ecuador in an effort to shirk court-ordered healthcare & environmental clean-up payments to the people of Ecuador for widespread pollution of the Amazon rainforest which caused sprawling environmental and health crises.
In 2009, Chevron Corporation – one of the largest U.S. oil corporations – launched a case against Ecuador under the Ecuador-United States Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) seeking to evade payment of a multibillion-dollar court ruling against the company for widespread pollution of the Amazon rainforest.1 For 26 years, Texaco Petroleum Corporation, later acquired by Chevron, performed oil operations in Ecuador. Ecuadorian courts found that during that period the company dumped billions of gallons of toxic water and dug hundreds of open-air oil sludge pits in Ecuador’s Amazon,2 poisoning the communities of some 30,000 Amazon residents,3 including the entire populations of six Indigenous groups (one of which is now extinct).4 After a legal battle spanning two decades and two countries, in November 2013 Ecuador’s highest court upheld prior rulings against Chevron for contaminating a large section of Ecuador’s Amazon and ordered the corporation to pay $9.5 billion to provide desperately needed clean-up and health care to afflicted Indigenous communities.5
Instead of abiding by the rulings, Chevron asked an investor-state tribunal to challenge the decision produced by Ecuador’s domestic legal system. Chevron asked the tribunal to order Ecuador’s taxpayers to hand over to the corporation any of the billions in damages it might be required to pay to clean up the still-devastated Amazon, plus all the legal fees incurred by the corporation in its investor-state case.6 In its investor-state claim, Chevron is seeking to re-litigate key aspects of the lengthy domestic court case, including whether the affected communities even had a right to sue the corporation. Chevron is claiming that its special foreign investor rights under the BIT have been violated.7 This, despite the fact that Texaco’s investment in Ecuador ended in 1992,8 the BIT did not take effect until 1997,9 and the BIT is not supposed to apply retroactively to cover past investments.10
The investor-state tribunal in this case has granted several of Chevron’s requests. It has ordered Ecuador’s government to violate its own Constitution and overturn a ruling upheld on appeal in its independent court system.11 And in a decision in September 2013, the tribunal took it upon itself to offer an interpretation of the Ecuadorian Constitution, which conflicted with that of Ecuador’s own high court, and declare that rights granted by Ecuadorian law do not actually exist.12
In 2010, multiple civil society organizations – including an Indigenous organization based out of Ecuador – issued a joint non-disputing party submission urging the tribunal to consider the fact that Ecuador’s domestic lawsuit against Chevron was protected by international treaties that established clear rights for Indigenous peoples.13 The tribunal refused to consider this submission.14
In 2018, the tribunal issued a partial award in favor of the investors, finding breaches of fair and equitable treatment and minimum standard of treatment.15 The state sought to set the partial award aside in the Netherlands but the District Court dismissed it, finding no issue with the judgment16 and the Hague Court of Appeal declined to overturn the judgment, upholding the lower court’s decision.17
A final award on damages remains pending.
A U.S. energy corporation cries “unfair treatment” following Argentina’s efforts to slow inflation and regain national stability following the 2001 economic crisis, demanding $133 million plus interest.
In July 2001, CMS Gas Transmission Company, a U.S. energy firm, filed a claim against Argentina under the Argentina-United States BIT for financial rebalancing policies enacted in response to a 2001 economic meltdown spurring social and political unrest.1 The case particularly targeted the government’s limitations on gas utility rate increases, an effort as part of Argentina’s Economic Emergency Law to stem runaway inflation.2
While utility rates were frozen, the international value of the Argentine peso, which had been pegged to the dollar, dropped precipitously. CMS claimed large revenue losses, argued that the freezing of consumers’ rates violated the BIT’s expropriation and “fair and equitable treatment” obligations, and demanded taxpayer compensation.3 The Argentine government contended that the reforms were nondiscriminatory and that domestic investors also had to face economic losses due to the emergency measures.4
Argentina further argued that the measures were necessary, given that it faced a national emergency.5 The Argentina-United States BIT states, “this Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.”6 However, the tribunal decided that the economic crisis in Argentina was not sufficiently severe for Argentina to be able to use this defense. It ruled that the government had denied CMS “fair and equitable treatment” and that Argentina’s taxpayers owed the company $133 million, plus interest.7 A year and a half later, a tribunal in another investor-state case came to a different conclusion, accepting Argentina’s “necessity defense” for the same economic crisis.8 In that case, also brought under the Argentina-United States BIT, three U.S. energy companies known collectively as LG&E challenged Argentina’s emergency measures, alleging the same BIT violations that CMS alleged. But in contrast to the tribunal in the CMS case, the LG&E tribunal concluded that Argentina’s actions were permissible under the BIT’s “necessity defense” because Argentina “faced an extremely serious threat to its existence, its political and economic survival, to the possibility of maintaining its essential services in operation, and to the preservation of its internal peace.”9
In response to the tribunal’s contrasting decision in the CMS case, Argentina’s Minister of Justice Horacio Rosatti noted that it was obvious to every Argentine citizen that consumer rates for public utility services should not be decided by a foreign tribunal.10 CMS eventually sold the “financial claim” resulting from its investor-state award to a “vulture fund” subsidiary of Bank of America.11 The bank subsidiary, Blue Ridge Investment, purchased from CMS the rights to collect on the investor-state tribunal’s award and has since sought to enforce the award in U.S. courts.12
American and Canadian mining companies join forces to punish Colombia for protecting part of the Amazon rainforest by establishing the Yaigojé Apaporis national park, demanding $16.5 billion in damages, which is over a quarter of Colombia’s national budget and 1500x what the mining companies had spent preparing for the mines.
U.S. corporation Tobie Mining and Energy, and the Canadian investors Cosigo and Cosigo Resources, claimed that the Colombian government violated the United States-Colombia FTA when it decided to create a nature reserve to protect Amazon rainforest land and prohibit mining within its borders. In 2008, the companies were granted interests in a gold mining concession by the Alvaro Uribe administration in the Taraira region of Colombia, near the Brazilian border, but before a final agreement could be reached, a national park was created, blocking the mine.1
The investors claim creating the national park was “fraudulent” and that denying their concession due to the park constitutes an expropriation of their investment.2 Thus, the companies are asking a private tribunal to order Colombia either to return their concession to allow them to mine in the Amazon, or to pay $16.5 billion – over 25 percent of Colombia’s national budget – to the corporation. Despite admitting having spent only $11 million in mining-related preparations, Tobie justifies the $16.5 billion demand by claiming that is what the corporation hypothetically could have earned if allowed to extract all the gold and iron believed to lie beneath the rainforest land.3
The Canadian investors are listed in the notice of intent despite Canada not being a party to the U.S. treaty with Colombia.4 The lawyer representing the claim has suggested that more claims against Colombia related to the nature reserve will be forthcoming.5
A Canadian mining company demands $250 million from Colombian taxpayers after Colombia protected a high-mountain ecosystem that provides water to 2.5 million people.
Eco Oro Minerals Corp., a Canadian mining company, launched an ISDS claim against Colombia, alleging violations of the minimum standard of treatment and expropriation under the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA), demanding $250 million for their investment plus interest and legal fees.1
In 1994, Eco Oro signed a contract with Colombia for an open-pit gold mining operation in the Santurbán Páramo. Páramos are defined as “high-mountain ecosystems that play a central role in maintaining biodiversity, premised on a unique capacity to absorb and restore water.”2 The Santurbán Páramo where Eco Oro’s mining project was located provides water to approximately 2.5 million people in 68 surrounding municipalities.3 At the time of signing, the Páramos were not demarcated, mining activities were unrestricted, and the area was not protected by law.4
Due to growing environmental concerns, Colombia began restricting mining activities in the Páramos over the years.5 By the time Eco Oro submitted a final application for construction in 2009, mining was eventually fully prohibited in the Páramos ecosystems,6 which encompassed about 54% of Eco Oro’s mining project.7 Eco Oro specifically objected to not being “grandfathered in” as a special exception to the mining ban.8
In 2021, the majority of the arbitral tribunal found that while there was no expropriation,9 Colombia had still breached the FTA’s provision establishing a “minimum standard of treatment” for the company.10
Despite this, the tribunal ruled that Eco Oro was not entitled to any damages, stating that Eco Oro failed to provide enough evidence to substantiate the amount of money that the company demanded.11 Still, Colombian taxpayers were ordered to cover half of the tribunal’s legal fees in addition to their own legal defense fees, amounting to more than $5.3 million.12
U.S. pharmaceutical giant, Eli Lilly, launches $500 million ISDS claim after Canada curbs monopoly practices by permitting more affordable versions of ADHD medications to enter the market.
Indiana-based Eli Lilly, the fifth-largest U.S. pharmaceutical corporation, challenged Canada’s patent standards after Canadian courts invalidated the company’s patents for Strattera and Zyprexa1 (these drugs are used to treat attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder).2 The corporation demanded $500 million CAD in damages from the Canadian government.3
Canadian federal courts applied Canada’s “promise utility doctrine” to rule that Eli Lilly failed to demonstrate or soundly predict that the drugs would provide the benefits that the company promised when applying for the patents’ monopoly protection rights.4 The resulting patent invalidations paved the way for the production of less expensive, generic versions of the drugs. Eli Lilly’s notice of arbitration argued that Canada’s entire legal basis for determining a patent’s validity – that a pharmaceutical corporation should be required to verify its promises of a drug’s utility to obtain a patent – is “arbitrary, unfair, unjust, and discriminatory.”5 The company alleged that Canada’s legal standard violated the NAFTA guarantee of a “minimum standard of treatment” for foreign investors and resulted in a NAFTA-prohibited expropriation.6
On March 16, 2017, after years of high-profile campaigning from access-to-medicines advocates, the tribunal dismissed the claim.7 However, the grounds on which it based its dismissal allowed the tribunal to refrain from commenting on many of the substantive issues raised in the case, meaning it avoided ruling on the merits of using the specific ISDS claims alleged in this case to attack a country’s patent regime.8
Instead, the tribunal focused on procedural matters unique to this filing. Namely, the tribunal noted that under NAFTA, cases must be filed within three years of an alleged “government action” that an investor claims violated its rights under NAFTA.9 Thus, the “alleged breach” in this case was not the previous change in Canadian patent law itself, but the Canadian courts’ enforcement of the law that resulted in Eli Lilly’s patents being invalidated.
The tribunal then concluded that such court enforcement did not constitute a “dramatic change” of the law.10 This fancy legal footwork allowed the tribunal to avoid having to weigh in on whether Canada’s patent law violated its intellectual property obligations and whether that would have constituted a violation of the NAFTA-guaranteed minimum standard of treatment for investors or also whether the law change would constitute an expropriation of Eli Lilly’s investment.
The tribunal ordered Eli Lilly to bear the $750,000 USD cost of the arbitration (the hourly fees of the three tribunalists, venue, travel costs, etc.) as well as 75 percent of Canada’s legal fees.11 This means that this case that Canada “won” still cost $1.5 million CAD in tax dollars to pay its lawyers.12
U.S. chemical corporation wrests $13 million from Canadian taxpayers in settlement and forces a reverse on Canada’s ban on a known-neurotoxic gasoline additive after the corporation launched an ISDS case alleging the chemical ban violated NAFTA.
Ethyl Corporation, a U.S. chemical company, launched a NAFTA investor-state case in 1997 over a Canadian ban of MMT, a toxic gasoline additive used to improve engine performance, seeking $250 million.1 MMT contains manganese − a known human neurotoxin.2 Canadian legislators, concerned about MMT’s public health and environmental risks, including its interference with emission-control systems, banned MMT’s intra-provincial transport and importation in 1997.3 Given that Canadian provinces have jurisdiction over most environmental matters, such actions are how a national ban of a substance could be enacted in Canada.4 When the law was being considered, Ethyl explicitly threatened that it would respond with a NAFTA challenge.5 MMT is not used in most countries outside Canada. It is banned by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in reformulated gasoline.6 Making good on its threat, Ethyl initiated a NAFTA claim against the toxics ban, arguing that it constituted a NAFTA-forbidden “indirect” expropriation of its assets.7
Though Canada argued that Ethyl did not have standing under NAFTA to bring the challenge, a NAFTA tribunal rejected Canada’s objections in a June 1998 jurisdictional decision that paved the way for a ruling on the substance of the case.8 Less than a month after losing the jurisdictional ruling, the Canadian government announced that it would settle with Ethyl. The terms of that settlement required the government to pay the firm $13 million in damages and legal fees, post advertising saying MMT was safe, and reverse the ban on MMT.9 As a result, today Canada depends largely on voluntary restrictions to reduce the presence of MMT in gas.10
A Dutch insurance company sues Poland for $1.6 billion for complying with the will of the people and reversing the decision to privatize a portion of Poland’s public insurance.
In 2003, Eureko, a Netherlands-based company, filed a claim against Poland under the Netherlands-Poland BIT for prohibiting it from taking a controlling stake in PZU, Poland’s first and largest insurance company.1 Facing significant public and political opposition to a previous administration’s decision to sell a controlling share of Poland’s public insurance firm to a foreign corporation, the Polish government reversed its privatization plans.2
Eureko argued that the government’s actions amounted to a violation of its BIT-mandated obligation to provide “fair and equitable treatment”.3 While divided, the majority of the tribunal held in a 2005 decision that Poland indeed violated that obligation, in addition to the prohibition against uncompensated expropriation.4 The tribunal also decided that the government’s actions violated a private contract with Eureko, and that this alleged contractual violation itself constituted a violation of the BIT. The tribunal determined that it was able to use the BIT to enforce the terms of a private contract through what is known as an “umbrella clause,” a BIT provision that empowers foreign investors to elevate contractual disputes to BIT investor-state cases.5 The dissenting tribunal member noted that empowering a firm to transform a contractual dispute into a BIT case “created a potentially dangerous precedent.”6
Poland also took issue with the appointment by Eureko of the arbitrator Judge Stephen Schwebel, who had a working relationship with a law firm that was launching other investor-state cases against Poland. After Poland’s attempt to challenge the appointment of Schwebel failed, the arbitration was expected to proceed to the damages phase, when a settlement was reached instead.7 Under the settlement, Eureko obtained a reported $1.6 billion for Poland’s decision to maintain domestic control of the country’s largest insurance firm.8
U.S. Big Oil corporations gang up to force Canada to pay them $13.2 million in damages instead of abiding by Canada’s recently enacted regulations requiring oil companies help fund research and development projects meant to support Canada’s poorest provinces.
In 2007, Mobil Investments Canada, owned by U.S. oil giant ExxonMobil, and U.S.-based Murphy Oil Corporation used NAFTA to launch an ISDS case against a Canadian province’s policies relating to oil exploration contracts, claiming $60 million in damages.1 The “Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board’s Guidelines for Research and Development Expenditures” require oil extraction firms to pay fees to support research and development in one of Canada’s poorest provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador. The guidelines apply to domestic and foreign concession holders alike.2 Offshore oil fields in the region, developed after significant infusions of public and private funds, were discovered to be far larger than anticipated, prompting a variety of new government measures that applied to all concession holders.3
In their NAFTA claim, the oil corporations argued that the new guidelines violated NAFTA’s prohibition on performance requirements.4 In 2012, a tribunal majority ruled in favor of Mobil and Murphy Oil, deeming the requirement to use larger-than-expected oil revenue to fund research and development as a NAFTA-barred performance requirement despite the fact that the policy applied to both domestic and foreign investors.5 NAFTA’s investment chapter, like those of most ISDS-enforced agreements, includes among the substantive rights it guarantees investors a flat ban on signatory nations’ establishment or maintenance of various requirements that investors must meet.
The tribunal’s order for Canada to pay $13.2 million plus interest for damages incurred until 2012 was made public in February 2015.6 The Canadian government attempted to have the award “set aside,” arguing that the tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in making the award, but that application was denied.7 Furthermore, in its ruling, the tribunal determined that as long as the Offshore Petroleum Board’s guidelines remained in place, Canada would be in “continuing breach” of its NAFTA obligations, “resulting in ongoing damage” to the oil company’s interest.8
In 2015, ExxonMobil launched another case against Canada demanding even more damages for their projects in Newfoundland and Labrador, but the case was settled, and the investor agreed to withdraw its claim and refrain from future claims pertaining to this issue in exchange for a $35 million CAD credit applied against research and development obligations under the 2004 Guidelines.9
U.S.-based hedge fund Gramercy Funds Management Bought heavily-discounted land bonds in Peru and when Peru refused to buy back the bonds at the outrageous price Gramercy demanded, the hedge fund took Peru to court and convinced the tribunal to force Peruvian taxpayers to pay $33 million.
In the late 1960s, Peru’s then-military government seized agricultural land as part of an aggressive redistributive land reform policy, compensating landowners with agrarian bonds. In the early 1980s, Peru suffered an economic crisis and defaulted on this debt. The bonds were practically worthless until a 2001 decision from Peru’s constitutional court ordered the bonds be repaid, though the court did not specify how.1 The U.S. hedge fund Gramercy Funds Management began buying Peruvian land bonds while their status was still uncertain, which allowed Gramercy to pay what experts surmise was only 20 percent of their face value.2 In 2013, Peru’s highest court ordered the government to establish a plan for repaying the debt.3 The government was tasked with assessing the current value of the bonds, given that in the 40 years since the bonds were issued, Peru suffered armed conflict, changed currencies twice, experienced hyperinflation, and more recently underwent a period of economic growth.
Unsatisfied with the government’s payment plan, Gramercy took action in the Peruvian court system to compel Peru to repay the bonds at a rate Gramercy deemed appropriate. Instead of waiting to see that case through, Gramercy also launched an ISDS case against Peru under the United States-Peru FTA, even though the pact did not go into effect until three years after Gramercy started buying the bonds.4
Gramercy, which has been involved in several ISDS cases, claimed that the Peruvian government’s payment plan violates its investor rights under the United States-Peru FTA by paying “as little as a few million dollars.”5 Gramercy demanded $1.6 billion, a sum they claimed is the contemporary equivalent of the value the bonds had when they were issued.6 This amount also equals a quarter of what the Peruvian government spent on education in 2014, or more than half of its infrastructure budget for 2016.7 The hedge fund claimed that the Peruvian government has violated the FTA’s standards of expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, and most favored nation.8
The Peruvian government countered that Gramercy purchased this public debt at “deeply discounted” rates and that Gramercy’s risky investment had no productive value in Peru.9 The government also countered that the firm acquired the bonds before the FTA was in effect, has refused to participate with other creditors in the debt restructuring, and is violating the terms of the FTA by simultaneously pursuing a claim in Peruvian courts.10 The government stated that Gramercy is waging “a desperate smear campaign,” which is impermissible under the tribunal’s rules and which threatens the country’s international status and credit rating.11 Nevertheless, in 2022, the tribunal awarded Gramercy $33 million, finding a breach of the trade agreement.12
Canadian mining firm sues Costa Rica for $94 million after Costa Rican courts upheld the unanimous legislative action to ban open-pit mining due to environmental concerns, despite the fact that the process in which they obtained their original license was so corrupt it resulted in a criminal investigation of the then-President.
In February 2014, Infinito Gold, a Canadian mining firm, filed a $94 million claim against Costa Rica under the Canada-Costa Rica BIT for a Costa Rican court decision to revoke Infinito’s Las Crucitas open-pit gold mining concession on environmental grounds.1 The mining license was secured in 2008 from then-President Oscar Arias and his environment minister. The Costa Rican Administrative Appeals Court later ordered a criminal investigation of Arias for having signed off on the project while environmental studies were still incomplete.2 The concession raised significant environmental concerns, including deforestation of 153 acres of pristine tropical rainforest. It also posed a significant health concern related to the leaching of chemicals used in the mining process that could contaminate drinking water near the San Juan River system.3
A Costa Rican court revoked the concession in 2010 on the basis of environmental damage caused by the project.4 Polls indicated that more than 75 percent of the Costa Rican population opposed the proposed mine, due in part to environmental concerns.5 Several weeks before the court ruling revoking Infinito’s concession, the Costa Rican legislature voted unanimously to ban new open-pit metal mines.6 Infinito appealed to Costa Rica’s Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court ruling against the firm in 2011.7 In its investor-state claim, Infinito asks a three-person tribunal to second guess the rulings of Costa Rica's courts and rule that Costa Rica’s prohibitions on new open-pit mining permits are an “unlawful expropriation” of Infinito’s investment and a violation of the firm’s BIT-protected right to fair and equitable treatment. “As a result of the new ban on open-pit mining, Industrias Infinito cannot apply for any new mining rights over the project area,” the firm noted in its brief.8 The case is pending.
An environmental NGO from Costa Rica submitted multiple non-disputing party submissions to the tribunal, alleging (among other things) that the company’s investment was procured through corruption.9
In 2021, the tribunal ruled that Costa Rica had breached the BIT’s fair and equitable treatment clause,10 noting that the state’s pursuit of environmental regulations “does not exempt the Respondent from [ISDS] liability” and dismissed the corruption claims.11 While Costa Rica was not ordered to pay any legal damages to the company,12 the court still ordered Costa Rica to pay for half of the tribunal costs in addition to all of their legal defense fees,13 amounting to approximately $3.7 million.14
US mining company cries victim after harmful extraction practices amount to "ecological catastrophe," sues Mexican government for an estimated $500 million.
In 2019, Legacy Vulcan LLC, a U.S. mining company and its Mexican subsidiary, Calizas Industriales de Carmes (“Calica”), launched an investor-state case against Mexico, alleging NAFTA violations. Specifically, the investors claimed Mexico violated NAFTA’s provisions on expropriation, most-favored-nation treatment, and fair and equitable treatment by interfering with its limestone extraction and exportation operations on the Yucatan Peninsula in the coastal state of Quintana Roo.1
In 1986, the investors acquired a limestone quarry lot2 and in 1996 acquired two more.3 The investor claims it entered into an agreement with the Mexican federal and local state government of Quintana Roo and received authorization “from an environmental standpoint” to exploit the reserves of limestone.4
The companies claim their mining project became targeted by “adverse measures” from Mexico that compromised their operation.5 The “adverse measures” were implemented to safeguard the environment and prevent further damage once Mexico became aware that the company had extracted limestone from a greater area and at a faster pace than agreed upon.6 The companies launched domestic litigation against Mexico and in 2014, the parties entered into comprehensive settlement agreements.7 The investors claim Mexico failed to uphold one of the agreements.8 The exact amount claimed by the investors has not been made public, but the Mexican government previously estimated the compensation sought at $500 million in damages.9
In 2021, the United States and Canada submitted separate non-disputing party submissions through which they addressed legal questions, not the merits of the case. The United States and Canada stated that the trade agreement does not include a duty to protect the investor’s legitimate expectations and commented on the distinction between direct and indirect claims for damages.10
In 2023, a representative for the Indigenous Playa del Carmen communities submitted a non-disputing party submission urging the tribunal to consider Mexico’s legal obligations towards its communities, stating that “if the mine continues… such a decision will result in a violation of international environmental [and human rights] law.”11 The case is pending.
U.S. oil and gas exploration and production company cries “unfair treatment” and launches a claim for $241 million against Canada after the issuance of a moratorium on fracking to allow officials to assess potential environmental damage to groundwater and air.
In September 2013, Lone Pine Resources, a U.S.-based oil and gas exploration and production company, launched a $241 million challenge against Canada under NAFTA to challenge Quebec’s suspension of oil and gas exploration permits for deposits under the St. Lawrence River as part of a wider moratorium on the controversial practice of hydraulic fracturing, or fracking.1 The provincial government had declared a moratorium in 2011 to conduct an environmental impact assessment of the extraction method widely known for leaching chemicals and gasses into groundwater and the air.2
Lone Pine had plans and permits to engage in fracking on over 30,000 acres of land directly beneath the St. Lawrence Seaway, the province’s largest waterway.3 According to Lone Pine, the moratorium contravened NAFTA’s protection against expropriation and guarantee of a “minimum standard of treatment”.4
In November 2022, the tribunal issued its award, finding that Lone Pine’s investment did not suffer from “substantial deprivation” and the minimum standard treatment had not been violated.5 As a result, the parties agreed to bear their own legal costs and split the costs of the arbitration.6 The investor’s appointed arbitrator issued a dissenting opinion, expressing that the cancellation of Lone Pine’s exploration permits constituted a violation of NAFTA’s minimum standard of treatment.7 This case is an example of even when a state wins, it still loses by having to pay costly legal and arbitration fees.
A Canadian mining company refuses to comply with domestic and international laws requiring a social license to operate a mining project, deploys extrajudicial force against locals, and then demands roughly $50 million from Peruvian taxpayers.
Lupaka Gold Corp., a Canadian mining company, launched an investor-state claim against Peru in 2021, demanding at least $47.7 million plus interest in damages under the Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement (FTA) over disputes arising from a gold, silver, and copper mining project.1 The company claims Peru failed to dissolve the violent invasions and blockades from the surrounding communities that opposed the mining project and as a result, the mining project was destroyed.2
Peru responded that Lupaka Gold failed to obtain a “social license” to operate, meaning achieving the trust and support for the mining project from the local communities and stakeholders as early as possible, as required under Peruvian law, international law, and industry principles.3
The state cited to the tribunal in Bear Creek v. Peru in defining the importance of obtaining a social license, “even though the concept of ‘social license’ is not clearly defined in international law, all relevant international instruments are clear that consultations with Indigenous communities are to be made with the purpose of obtaining consent form all the relevant communities”.4
Peru also emphasizes Indigenous people’s right to free, prior, and informed consent regarding the utilization of minerals and other resources affecting their lands or territories and other resources, as provided in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), a fundamental international instrument that provides the framework of the rights of Indigenous people and was adopted by 144 countries, including Peru and Canada.5
Furthermore, Peru asserted that the investor ignored the environmental concerns expressed by the communities over the project,6 repeatedly demanded forceful intervention from the Peruvian government,7 and deployed a private security company to use force and violence against the locals rather than engaging in meaningful conversations to understand and address the concerns.8
An official responsible for facilitating dialogues between the community and the company noted that the company “did not appear to understand, or they refused to accept, that in situations involving the rights of rural or Indigenous communities… the conflict must be approached through dialogue and not through public force.”9 The case is pending.
A U.S. waste management corporation cries “unfair treatment” and demands more than $16 million from Mexico when their expansion permit for a toxic waste facility was denied amid concerns of water contamination and other environmental and health hazards.
In 1997, Metalclad Corporation, a U.S. waste management firm, launched a NAFTA investor-state dispute against Mexico seeking over $43 million in damages.1 The corporation alleged NAFTA violations over the decision of Guadalcazar,2 a Mexican municipality, not to grant a construction permit for expansion of a toxic waste facility amid concerns of water contamination and other environmental and health hazards.3 The local government had already denied similar permits to the Mexican firm from which Metalclad acquired the facility.4 Metalclad argued that the decision to deny a permit to it, as a foreign investor operating under NAFTA’s investor rights, amounted to expropriation without compensation, and a denial of NAFTA’s guarantee of “fair and equitable treatment.”5
The tribunal ruled in favor of the firm, ordering Mexico to compensate Metalclad for the diminution of its investment’s value.6 The order to compensate for a “regulatory taking” was premised on the tribunal’s finding that the denial of the construction permit unless and until the site was remediated amounted to an “indirect” expropriation.7 The tribunal also ruled that Mexico violated NAFTA’s obligation to provide foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment,”8 because the firm was not granted a “transparent and predictable” regulatory environment.9 The decision has been described as “placing a heavy burden” under NAFTA on governments “to ensure legal certainty relating to the investment for all levels of government within a jurisdiction, including those over which they have no authority.”10 After a Canadian court slightly modified the compensation amount ordered by the investor-state tribunal, Mexico was required to pay Metalclad more than $16 million.11
U.S. energy company violates Ecuadorian law and instead of accepting the consequences of their actions, uses international investment law to siphon $1.4 billion from Ecuador’s taxpayers.
In 2006, Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy) launched a case against Ecuador under the Ecuador-United States Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) after the government terminated an oil concession due to the U.S. oil corporation’s breach of the contract and Ecuadorian law.1 Oxy illegally sold 40 percent of its production rights to another firm without government approval, despite a provision in the concession contract stating that sale of Oxy’s production rights without government pre-approval would terminate the contract.2 The contract explicitly enforced Ecuador’s hydrocarbons law, which protects the government’s prerogative to vet companies seeking to produce oil in its territory, a particular concern in the environmentally sensitive Amazon region where Oxy was operating.3 Oxy launched its BIT case two days after the Ecuadorian government terminated the oil concession, claiming that the government’s enforcement of the contract terms and hydrocarbons law violated its BIT commitments, including the obligation to provide the firm “fair and equitable treatment.”4
The tribunal acknowledged that Oxy had broken the law,5 that the response of the Ecuadorian government (forfeiture of the firm’s investment) was lawful, and that Oxy should have expected that response.6 But the tribunal then concocted a new obligation for the government (one not specified by the BIT itself) to respond proportionally to Oxy’s legal breach as part of the “fair and equitable treatment” requirement. Deeming themselves the arbiters of proportionality, the tribunal determined that Ecuador had violated the novel investor-state obligation.7
The tribunal majority ordered Ecuador to pay Oxy $2.3 billion (including compound interest), one of the largest investor-state awards to date.8 To calculate this penalty, the tribunal estimated the amount of future profits that Oxy would have received from full exploitation of the oil reserves it had forfeited due to its legal breach, including profits from not-yet-discovered reserves.9 Using logic that a dissenting tribunalist described as “egregious”, the tribunal determined that the damages should be based on the entire value of Oxy’s original contract even though the firm sold a 40 percent share because the sale violated Ecuadorian law and therefore could not be recognized in determining the values in the case.10 The tribunal also arbitrarily concluded that Ecuador was 75 percent responsible for the conflict and thus should pay 75 percent of the projected losses to Oxy.11
Ecuador filed a request for annulment of the award, raising four different arguments regarding why the tribunal’s decision to grant jurisdiction over the case in the first instance – and thus the entire $2.3 billion award – should be annulled.12 In 2015, an annulment committee rejected all four of Ecuador’s arguments.13 However, based on the dissenting tribunalist’s argument that it was outrageous to order Ecuador to pay Oxy damages for the 40 percent share of the investment that it had sold away,14 the annulment committee partially annulled the award, reducing the damages that had been based on the 40 percent share that had been sold.15 The committee’s ruling means that the original award of $2.3 billion (including compound interest) was reduced to $1.4 billion, still an enormous amount for Ecuador to pay Oxy over a conflict arose from Oxy selling unauthorized rights under a contract that explicitly stipulated that doing so could cause forfeiture of Oxy’s investment.
Odyssey Marine Exploration demands $3.5 billion from the Mexican government after being denied a permit to wreak havoc on endangered species due to their lack of experience, technical expertise, or data on risky deep-sea mining.
Odyssey Marine Exploration Inc., a U.S. deep-ocean mining company, launched a claim against Mexico alleging violations under NAFTA’s provisions on national treatment, minimum standard of treatment, and expropriation of their investment located on Mexico’s Gulf of Ulloa, involving one of the largest sedimentary phosphate sand deposits discovered in the Americas. Phosphate is a valuable finite resource used mainly to produce fertilizer and animal feed.1
To begin extraction, the project required environmental approval from Mexico’s Ministry of the Environment and of Natural Resources (“SEMARNAT”). The Ministry denied Odyssey’s request due to the projected impact on the Gulf of Ulloa’s ecosystem, specifically on endangered species such as the loggerhead turtles, and cited concerns over Odyssey’s lack of experience, technical expertise, or data on risky deep-sea mining.2 Odyssey petitioned the tribunal to decide whether Mexico illegitimately denied the seabed mining project while Mexico maintains that the project was fairly denied because the proposed activities would have catastrophic impacts on the Gulf of Ulloa.3
In 2021, the Center for International Environmental Law (“CIEL”) and the Puerto Chale Fishing Cooperative, whose fishing grounds would be devastated by the mining project, requested permission to introduce a non-disputing party submission or amicus curiae to provide factual information on the effects of the project on the ocean, but the majority of the tribunal rejected their petition.4 The dissenting arbitrator expressed that the petitioners had significant interest in the outcome of the arbitration and would contribute a unique perspective that would assist the tribunal in its decision.5
Odyssey is demanding $3.5 billion for future lost profits.6 The case is pending.
A US company attempts to fleece$10.7 billion from Honduras in lost potential profits when a corrupt law allowing developers to establish private cities with administrative, judicial, and fiscal autonomy is revoked by popular vote under a new presidency.
U.S. company Honduras Próspera Inc. and its affiliates, St. John’s Bay Development Company LLC and Próspera Arbitration Center LLC, launched an investor-state claim against Honduras under the CAFTA-DR, demanding $10.7 billion in damages for impairment of its investment.1
In 2013, Honduras passed the Organic Law of the Employment and Economic Development Zones (“ZEDEs Organic Law”), which appeared to designate areas as special employment and economic development zones (“ZEDEs” in their Spanish acronym) like charter cities but instead granted investors semi-complete sovereignty. The legislation allowed investors to establish their own laws, create an independent justice system, and have administrative and fiscal autonomy.2 As a result, investors have used the law to create private cities that operate independently from Honduras with their own laws and regulations that Hondurans cannot enter without authorization.3
The ZEDEs were very unpopular in Honduras and viewed as a “vector for corruption” garnering widespread criticism and social unrest.4 Specifically, the Próspera ZEDE is located in Roatán, a Caribbean island off the coast of Honduras, home to Indigenous people and Garifuna settlers, who have inhabited the island for centuries and now worry their land will be expropriated by Próspera.5
The current president of Honduras, Xiomara Castro, made overturning the ZEDEs Organic Law a campaign promise citing corruption, granting sovereignty to foreigners at the expense of Hondurans, and fraudulently supplanting the national justice system.6 In April 2022, Congress unanimously repealed the ZEDEs Organic law.7 As a result, Próspera who had been operating in Honduras since 20188 claimed Honduras breached the agreement’s most-favored-nation, minimum standard of treatment, and expropriation provisions when Congress repealed the law.
Próspera appointed its arbitrator in February 2023, but the rest of the tribunal has not been configured yet. In March 2023, 33 U.S. lawmakers urged the U.S. Trade Representative and State Department to intervene on behalf of Honduras, citing violations of their sovereignty and democracy, and remove ISDS from existing trade agreements.9
The government of Honduras withdrew from the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the “ICSID Convention”) in 2024, a symbolic move demonstrating that Honduras no longer recognizes the authority of the World Bank tribunal overseeing the case.10
A U.S.-based railroad firm fails to make good-faith efforts on their contract to rehabilitate Guatemala's railway network and when Guatemala merely initiated a review of the contract, the corporation launches a $15 million claim against Guatemala, resulting in a $18.6 million win for the American company.
U.S.-based Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) launched an investor-state claim in 2007 under the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) after the government of Guatemala initiated a legal process to consider revoking a disputed railroad contract with the firm.1 RDC was engaged in the domestic legal process but still alleged that it had been denied fair and equitable treatment.
Guatemala privatized its railroad system in 1997.2 RDC’s contract in that privatization provided for rehabilitation of the entire railway network in five phases and significant investment in rolling stock and rail lines. After its first eight years of operation, RDC had only completed the first phase.3 The Guatemalan government initiated a review of an RDC contract in a process that could result in its termination, after multiple assessments concluded that it did not comply with Guatemalan law.4 This process, called lesivo, provided RDC the opportunity to present its case before an administrative court, and then appeal the resulting decision to the country’s Supreme Court.5 Most lesivo actions taken by the Guatemalan government pertained to domestic firms.6
While taking advantage of this domestic due process and continuing to earn money from its investment, RDC launched its CAFTA-DR claim. It alleged that the lesivo itself was an indirect expropriation and a violation of CAFTA’s national treatment and “minimum standard of treatment” rules.7 The tribunal not only allowed the ISDS claim to move forward despite the unresolved domestic process but opined that in such instances of parallel ISDS claims, investors should be allowed to access extrajudicial investor-state proceedings before the conclusion of domestic legal processes.8
In 2012, the tribunal ruled in favor of RDC, ordering the government to pay the firm $18.6 million. The tribunal upheld the allegation that Guatemala’s initiation of the lesivo process had failed to afford RDC a “minimum standard of treatment.”9 In doing so, the tribunal ignored the definition of that standard found in a CAFTA-DR annex that was ostensibly designed to limit tribunalist discretion. CAFTA-DR governments had inserted the annex after a series of investor-state had interpreted the “minimum standard of treatment” obligation to mean that investors must be guaranteed a stable regulatory framework that does not frustrate the expectations they held at the time they established their investment.10 In defending itself against an investor-state challenge that tried to invoke this sweeping interpretation, the U.S. government stated, “if States were prohibited from regulating in any manner that frustrated expectations – or had to compensate for any diminution in profit – they would lose the power to regulate”.11 By defining “minimum standard of treatment” in the CAFTA-DR Annex as derived from customary international law that “results from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation,” the U.S. and other CAFTA-DR governments attempted to constrain “minimum standard of treatment” to an obligation to afford such basic rights as due process and police protection.12 But the RDC tribunal ignored the annex and rejected the official submissions of four CAFTA-DR governments, including the U.S. government, arguing that the foreign investor right was limited.13 Instead, the tribunal borrowed a broad interpretation of “minimum standard of treatment,” one that included protection of investors’ expectations, from another investor-state tribunal and used it to rule against Guatemala.14
A Canadian mining company demands $118 million in damages for lost profits after mining activities are banned to protect and preserve the Páramos, a range of sensitive high-altitude ecosystems that provide 85% of Colombia’s water supply.
In 2018, Red Eagle Exploration Limited, a Canadian mining company, initiated an ISDS case against Colombia under the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Red Eagle claims the FTA was violated when the Colombian Constitutional Court decided to ban mining operations in the Páramos,1 a range of high-altitude ecosystems that provide 85% of the country’s water supply (See Eco Oro v. Colombia above).2 The ban was placed to create a natural reserve to protect the Amazon rainforest and Indigenous communities in the region. Red Eagle claimed that the ban on mining activities in the Páramos affected a significant portion of their investment and sought $118 million in damages for lost profits.3
In 2024, the tribunal ruled against Red Eagle, arguing that the company’s claims lacked merit. Despite “winning,” Colombia still had to pay its legal defense fees in addition to half of the tribunal fees, amounting to approximately $3.4 million USD.4
Not only did U.S. companies file a lawsuit when Peru denied the polluters a THIRD extension to clean up one of the world’s most polluted sites, demanding Peru should assume liability for a class action lawsuit claiming compensation and medical assistance for children injured by toxic emissions, but when the case was dismissed on a technicality (still costing Peru millions in fees), they filed a new ISDS suit to avoid responsibility.
In 2011, Renco Group, Inc., owned by billionaire Ira Rennert, and its affiliate Doe Run Resources Corp., launched an ISDS case against Peru, demanding $800 million from the government of Peru.1 The corporations claimed that the Peruvian government violated the United States-Peru FTA by not granting an extension on the corporation’s overdue commitment to clean up environmental contamination.2 Doe Run Peru, Renco’s Peruvian subsidiary, failed to meet its environmental clean-up commitments under the terms of a 1997 privatization of a metal smelting operation in La Oroya, Peru, one of the world’s most polluted sites.3 The Peruvian government granted two extensions past the 2007 date when Doe Run’s sulfur oxide treatment facility should have been finished, a commitment that the corporation repeatedly failed to fulfill.4
In 2007 and 2008, Doe Run was challenged in class action lawsuits filed in Missouri courts, the firm’s state of incorporation. The suits demanded compensation and medical assistance for La Oroyan children that had been injured by toxic emissions from the smelter since its acquisition by Renco.5 In 2010, the company launched an $800 million investor-state case against Peru under the FTA, claiming a violation of fair and equitable treatment, blaming Peru for not granting a third extension to comply with unfulfilled 1997 environmental commitments, and demanding Peru, not Renco, should assume liability for the Missouri cases.6 Renco tried three times unsuccessfully to remove the Missouri case from state to federal court but a week after launching the ISDS claim, the same judge that previously denied Renco’s request granted it.7
In July 2016, after six years of costly litigation with the three ISDS arbitrators charging hundreds of dollars per hour in addition to Peru paying for its defense lawyers, the tribunal dismissed Renco’s claim. Oddly, it did so based on a jurisdictional issue it could have decided years earlier. The tribunal determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the case because the company failed to fully comply with an FTA requirement that it had to waive certain domestic litigation rights to proceed with an ISDS claim.8 However, the tribunal ruled that the Peruvian government and the corporation must split the costs of arbitration and bear their own legal costs.9 This means a $8.39 million bill for Peruvian taxpayers despite the case being dismissed and the grounds for dismissal on grounds of failure by the corporation to meet the technical rules for pursuing an ISDS claim.10
At the time of the decision, Renco stated that “the Tribunal's decision is an insignificant victory for Peru,” and immediately threatened to refile the same claims after resolving the technicality upon which the case was dismissed.11
In August 2016, Renco made good on its threat and filed a new Notice of Intent to restart an ISDS case on the same matters.12 In 2020, the tribunal in this case found that the claims are not time-barred, despite Peru’s objection that the merits of the case predated the FTA’s entry into force and has allowed arbitration to proceed.13 The case is pending.
Canada denied a US company’s permit for a natural gas liquefaction project due to environmental concerns and the company is now suing Canada for $20 billion for “lost future profits.”
In February 2023, Ruby River Capital LLC, a U.S. company, launched an investor-state dispute against Canada, under the legacy NAFTA provision of the USMCA for violations of minimum standard of treatment, national treatment, most-favored nation treatment, and expropriation.1
Ruby River Capital and a Canadian company, GNL Quebec, intended to build a “carbon neutral” natural gas liquefaction complex (the GNLQ project) in the port of the Saguenay River in Quebec and a gas pipeline in Ontario (the Gazduq project). The Saguenay drains into the St. Lawrence River, a major commercial waterway in North America that serves as the primary drainage outflow of the Great Lakes Basin.2 The company claims the GNLQ project would have been powered by hydroelectricity and as such, emit much lower greenhouse gas emissions than other comparable facilities.
In 2021, the government of Quebec denied the environmental permits for the GNLQ project — which also led to the termination of the Gazduq project3 — citing concerns over the project’s impact on the local environment and wildlife, specifically beluga whales in the Saguenay and St. Lawrence River, and concerns over greenhouse gas emissions.4 In the ISDS claim, the company specifically objected to Canada’s new environmental regulations, which called for companies to play a positive role in the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions in addition to promoting the green energy transition.5
Ruby River Capital claims the environmental permits were denied for political reasons, not environmental concerns about the project.6 The tribunal rejected a request from Canada for the case to be suspended until a determination had been made in another NAFTA legacy case.7 That case — TC Energy v. United States — has since been dismissed on grounds of jurisdiction.8
The company is seeking compensation for the alleged $120 million spent to obtain permits and approvals for the project, plus lost potential profits of $20 billion.9 The case is pending.
U.S. waste treatment company launched ISDS claim against Canada following the temporary ban on exports of PCBs (highly carcinogenic chemical compounds whose production was banned in the US by the Toxic Substances Control Act in 1979 and internationally by the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants in 2001) to the United States in adherence to the Basel Convention.
In 1998, S.D. Myers, a U.S. waste treatment company, launched a NAFTA investor-state challenge against a temporary Canadian ban on the export of a hazardous waste called polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB).1 Canada banned exports of toxic waste to the United States absent explicit permission from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. And, as a signatory to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Canadian policy generally limited exports of toxic waste.2 Meanwhile, the U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act banned imports of hazardous waste, with limited exceptions, such as waste from U.S. military bases.3 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has determined that PCBs are harmful to humans and toxic to the environment.4 However, in 1995 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency decided to allow S.D. Myers and nine other companies to import PCBs into the United States for processing and disposal.5 Canada issued a temporary ban on PCB shipment, seeking to review the conflicting laws and regulations and its obligations under the Basel Convention.6 S.D. Myers argued that the Canadian ban constituted “disguised discrimination,” was “tantamount to an expropriation” and violated NAFTA’s prohibition of performance requirements and obligation to afford a “minimum standard of treatment.”7
A tribunal upheld S.D. Myers’ claims of discrimination and found the export ban to violate NAFTA’s “minimum standard of treatment” obligation because it limited the firm’s plan to treat the waste in Ohio.8 The panel also stated that a foreign firm’s “market share” in another country could be considered a NAFTA-protected investment and eschewed Canada’s argument that S.D. Meyers had no real investment in Canada.9 The tribunal ordered Canada to pay the company $6.9 million CAD.10
A Dutch investment company took advantage of a widespread bank debt crisis in the Czech Republic by suing the Czech government, alleging they did not bail out a foreign bank the same way as national banks.
Saluka Investments, an investment company from the Netherlands, filed an investor-state claim in 2001 under the Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT against the Czech government for not bailing out a private bank, in which the company had a stake, in the same way that the government bailed out banks in which the government had a major stake.1 The bailouts came in response to a widespread bank debt crisis.2 Investicni a Postovni Banka (IPB), the first large bank to be fully privatized in the Czech Republic,3 along with three large banks in which the government retained significant ownership, had been suffering from significant debt and borderline insolvency, threatening the Czech banking sector.4 Consequently, the government placed IPB into forced administration in 2000 and then sold the bank for one crown to another bank.5
Saluka, a minority shareholder in IPB,6 claimed the Czech government violated the BIT’s “fair and equitable treatment” provisions because the government did not give IPB the same degree of assistance as it gave to the banks in which the government possessed a large stake.7 The government argued that rectifying IPB’s debt problems was the responsibility of private shareholders, while the problems of the large banks in which the government had a major shareholding interest were the government’s responsibility.8
The investor-state tribunal decided that the Czech Republic had violated the BIT’s “fair and equitable” treatment obligation and acted discriminatorily by giving greater government aid to banks in which the government was a major stakeholder.9 The tribunal ordered the government to pay Saluka $236 million.10
US-owned investment company TCW Group demands $606 million from the Dominican Republic (despite only investing $2 million), arguing that the government violated CAFTA-DR by refusing to gouge the price of electricity amid a nationwide economic and energy crisis.
In 2007, TCW Group, a U.S. investment management corporation that jointly owned with the government one of the Dominican Republic’s three electricity distribution firms, claimed that the government violated the Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) by failing to raise electricity rates and failing to prevent electricity theft by poor residents.1 The French multinational Société Générale (SocGen), which owned the TCW Group, filed a parallel claim under the Dominican Republic-France BIT.2
TCW launched its case two weeks after CAFTA-DR’s enactment, arguing that decisions taken before the treaty’s implementation violated the treaty.3 TCW took issue with the government’s unwillingness to raise electricity rates, a decision taken in response to a nationwide energy crisis.4 TCW also protested that the government did not subsidize electricity rates, which would have diminished electricity theft by poor residents. The New York Times noted that such subsidization was not feasible for the government after having just spent large sums to rectify a banking crisis.5 TCW alleged expropriation and violation of CAFTA-DR’s guarantee of fair and equitable treatment.6
TCW demanded $606 million from the government for the alleged CAFTA-DR violations, despite having spent just $2 million to purchase the business from another U.S. investor.7 The company TCW demanded $606 million from the government for the alleged CAFTA-DR violations, despite having spent just $2 million to purchase the business from another U.S. investor.8 The company also admitted to having “not independently committed additional capital” to the electricity distribution firm after its $2 purchase in 2004.9 After a tribunal constituted under the Dominican Republic-France BIT issued a jurisdictional ruling in favor of SocGen, allowing the case to move forward, the government decided to settle with SocGen and TCW. The government paid the foreign firms $26.5 million to drop the cases, reasoning that it was cheaper than continuing to pay legal fees.10
Canadian oil company sues the U.S. government for $15 billion following the refusal to authorize construction of the highly unpopular TransCanada Keystone XL pipeline– one of the most monumental victories for climate and Indigenous rights in decades.
In June 2016, the TransCanada Corporation launched an ISDS case under NAFTA demanding $15 billion in compensation because the corporation’s bid to build a pipeline was rejected by the U.S. government.1 The $15 billion claim was five times more than the $3.1 billion that TransCanada said it already had invested in the pipeline project because the compensation demand also included the future expected profits that TransCanada claimed it would have earned had the pipeline been allowed.2
The proposed 875-mile pipeline – called the Keystone XL – would transport to the U.S. Gulf Coast up to 830,000 barrels per day of highly-corrosive crude oil extracted from tar sands in Alberta, Canada. The pipeline would have transported one of the dirtiest fossil fuels on the planet3 across more than a thousand rivers, streams, lakes, and wetlands as it traversed six U.S. states.4
Indigenous leaders, farmers, and ranchers in the path of the project stressed that a spill from the pipeline would threaten their lands and livelihoods.5 Their concerns were bolstered by environmental and health experts who provided evidence during the course of various federal and state reviews of the project about how tar sands oil development in Alberta, Canada already has devastated the land and water of Canadian First Nations communities, released toxic chemicals that poisoned and sickened these communities6 and threatened local species of fish and wildlife.7
The pipeline also raises significant concerns with respect to its climate impacts. If the pipeline were completed, it would create new demand for intensified carbon-intensive tar sands extraction and processing as the purpose of the pipeline was to transport the tar-sands oil to U.S. Gulf Coast refineries for processing so finished product could be exported into the global market.8
The November 2015 decision by the U.S. government to reject the pipeline project came after tens of thousands of citizens in the states that would be affected and by environmental activists nationwide had worked for six years to demonstrate that the pipeline was not in the national interest and would pose serious health and environmental risks.9
In January 2016, just two months after the U.S. government’s decision to reject the pipeline, TransCanada filed notice of intent to start an ISDS case under NAFTA.10 It simultaneously filed a case in U.S. federal court, claiming that the decision to reject the pipeline was unconstitutional because only Congress, not the president, has authority to make such a decision.11
In its ISDS notice of arbitration, TransCanada claimed the United States had violated four different investor rights provided by NAFTA.12 First, it claimed that the U.S. government violated the “minimum standard of treatment” standard, arguing that the U.S. government led TransCanada to develop “reasonable expectations” that the Obama administration would approve the pipeline, only to ultimately reject it.13 The company noted that, while in 2010 the U.S. State Department was “inclined” to approve the project, subsequently “politicians and environmental activists ... continued to assert that the pipeline would have dire environmental consequences,” which ultimately led the Obama administration to reject it for “symbolic reasons, not because of the merits.”14
TransCanada also alleged that disapproval of the project violated the NAFTA investor protection against “indirect expropriation,” arguing that the pipeline “substantially deprived” the company of its investment in the project.”15 TransCanada also claimed violations of NAFTA’s “national treatment” standard, claiming that the United States treated the Canadian firm worse than it treated national firms, and of NAFTA’s “most-favored nation” standard, claiming that the United States treated the Canadian firm worse than other international pipeline companies.16
In his first week as president in January 2017, Donald Trump signed an executive order inviting TransCanada to submit a new application for approval of the pipeline’s construction.17 ISDS rules would have permitted TransCanada to continue to pursue compensation via ISDS for lost revenue it claims was caused by the project’s delay even after receiving a permit.18 However, on February 28, 2017, the company suspended its case for 30 days, which coincided precisely with the time period by which the U.S. State Department was to make a final decision on the new permit application.19
During that 30-day period, on March 4, 2017, the White House clarified that a previous Trump executive order calling for pipelines to be constructed with American-made steel and pipe would not apply to the Keystone XL.20 Shortly thereafter, the State Department issued the permit.21 TransCanada then announced that it would discontinue its NAFTA ISDS case.22
However, in January 2021 during President Biden’s first day in office, he revoked the permit for the Keystone XL pipeline.23 Following the new revocation, TC Energy Corporation (formerly TransCanada Corporation, the same claimant as the first case) jointly with TransCanada Ltd launched a second ISDS case against the US invoking the NAFTA legacy provision of the USMCA.24 In 2023, following the U.S.’ request for bifurcation – meaning the tribunal would hear the case on the basis of jurisdiction before merits – the tribunal granted the request.25
In 2024, the tribunal dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, as NAFTA was replaced by the USMCA in 2020, which eliminated ISDS between the U.S. and Canada. President Biden revoked the permit for the pipeline on his first day in office, long after Canadian companies lost the right to sue the U.S. government under NAFTA.[26] ISDS tribunals are not bound by precedent in the way that courts are, so it remains to be seen if this jurisdictional defense will be successful for Canada and Mexico, which are currently battling legacy ISDS cases brought under the old NAFTA rules, with amounts sought totalling upwards of $3 billion.[27]
Even though the United States “won,” according to documents released by the tribunal overseeing the case, the U.S. paid out at least $250,000 in taxpayer money to cover the initial tribunal members’ fees and expenses.[28] The number is likely higher, though the full amount has not been disclosed to the public. This is in addition to paying the salaries of the many State Department attorneys who defended the U.S. in the case and the lost opportunity cost of other work they could be doing. On top of that, the Canadian province of Alberta still has a separate ongoing ISDS case against the U.S. over the Keystone XL Pipeline.[29]
Swedish energy company forces the German government into rolling back environmental regulations aimed at curbing carbon emissions and water pollution using threat of a $1.9 billion expropriation claim.
Vattenfall, a Swedish energy firm, launched a $1.9 billion investor-state case against Germany in 2009 under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) over permit delays for a coal-fired power plant in Hamburg.1 According to Vattenfall, delays of required government permits started when the state’s environmental ministry established “very clear requirements” for the plant, due to “the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change having alerted the public to the impending climate change”.2 Public opposition to the proposed plant focused on prospective carbon emissions and water pollution.3 Further delays, according to Vattenfall, occurred when the Green Party – which opposed the plant on environmental grounds – formed a coalition with the Christian Democrats after state elections in 2008. After Vattenfall litigated in domestic courts, the coalition government issued the permits to Vattenfall but with additional requirements to protect the Elbe River.4
Rather than comply with these requirements, Vattenfall launched its investor-state case against Germany, arguing that Hamburg’s environmental rules amounted to an expropriation and a violation of Germany’s obligation to afford foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment.”5 In response, Michael Müller, then Germany’s deputy environment minister, stated, “It’s really unprecedented how we are being pilloried just for implementing German and European Union (EU) laws.”6
To avoid the uncertainty of a prospective investor-state tribunal ruling ordering payment of a massive amount of compensation, the German government reached a settlement with Vattenfall in 2010. The settlement obligated the Hamburg government to drop its additional environmental requirements and issue the contested permits required for the plant to proceed.7 The settlement also waived Vattenfall’s earlier commitments to mitigate the coal plant’s impact on the Elbe River.8 Any monetary payment extracted from German taxpayers in the settlement has not been disclosed. Vattenfall’s coal plant in Hamburg began operating in February 2014.9
Swedish multinational power company Vattenfall extracts $1.5 billion from the German government following Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear energy in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power disaster.
In May 2012, Vattenfall launched a second investor-state case under the ECT against Germany, demanding a reported $5 billion in taxpayer compensation for Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear power.1 The government made that decision in response to widespread German public opposition to nuclear power generation in the wake of Japan’s 2011 Fukushima nuclear power disaster. The German Parliament amended the Atomic Energy Act to roll back a 2010 extension of the lifespan of nuclear plants, and to abandon the use of nuclear energy by 2022.2 Vattenfall claimed Germany’s policy change violated its obligations to foreign investors under the ECT.3
Press reports and inquiries from the German Parliament indicated that the corporation demanded about 4.7 billion euros (more than $5 billion USD) from German taxpayers for claimed losses relating to two Vattenfall nuclear plants affected by the phase-out.4 Though Germany attempted to halt Vattenfall’s claim as one “manifestly without merit,” the investor-state tribunal decided in 2013 to allow the claim to proceed.5 However, in 2021 the parties agreed to settle and discontinue the arbitration proceeding.6 Per the settlement, Germany agreed to pay the investor approximately 1.4 billion euros or 1.5 billion USD.7
Following the Egyptian revolution in 2011, French multinational corporation sues Egypt demanding $100 million for increasing the minimum wage and forces the Egyptian government to engage in a costly defense of the peoples’ will.
Veolia Propreté, a French multinational corporation, launched an investor-state claim against Egypt in 2012, demanding at least $110 million following Egypt’s decision to raise the minimum wage. The minimum wage increase followed the 2011 Egyptian revolution. Here, the Egyptian government tried to amend and rescind some of the decisions made by Hosni Mubarak, a military-backed dictator known for prolific corruption and iron-fisted rule.
In response, the corporation claimed violations of the France-Egypt BIT relating to a 15-year contract for waste management in the city of Alexandria. In particular, Veolia claimed that changes to Egypt’s labor laws – including increasing the minimum wage – negatively affected the company’s investment, and Egypt violated its contract and the BIT’s investor protections by not helping the corporation offset such costs.
In 2018, the tribunal found that Egypt did not breach the BIT’s fair and equitable treatment standard and Egypt’s conduct did not amount to an expropriation. The award was issued after years of costly arbitration, and this case serves as an example that even when states “win” in ISDS, they still lose. Egypt was still legally bound to pay for part of the arbitration despite no wrongdoing, and the burden to pay ultimately fell on Egyptian taxpayers.
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